Abstract-This paper proposes a novel fully distributed and collaborative k-anonymity protocol (LPAF) to protect users' location information and ensure better privacy while forwarding queries/replies to/from untrusted location-based service (LBS) over opportunistic mobile networks (OppMNets). We utilize a lightweight multihop Markov-based stochastic model for location prediction to guide queries toward the LBS's location and to reduce required resources in terms of retransmission overheads. We develop a formal analytical model and present theoretical analysis and simulation of the proposed protocol performance. We further validate our results by performing extensive simulation experiments over a pseudorealistic city map using map-based mobility models and using real-world data trace to compare LPAF to existing location privacy and benchmark protocols. We show that LPAF manages to keep higher privacy levels in terms of k-anonymity and quality of service in terms of success ratio and delay, as compared with other protocols, while maintaining lower overheads. Simulation results show that LPAF achieves up to an 11% improvement in success ratio for pseudorealistic scenarios, whereas real-world data trace experiments show up to a 24% improvement with a slight increase in the average delay.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
NCORPORATING location information in mobile networks has sparked many innovative applications, such as [1] and [2] . However, privacy-conscious users are more aware of the potential risks of such widely accessible information and tracking capability [3] . Ensuring users' location privacy while accessing location-based services (LBSs) in Opportunistic Mobile Networks (OppMNets) is a challenging problem due to sharing of users' location information to receive tailored services. Users cannot typically rely on a trusted third party (TTP) to anonymize or obfuscate their location information due to the frequent disconnections from the infrastructure. Communication in OppMNets relies on multihop store-carryforward transfer between mobile devices when they are in the communication area of each other (i.e., when an encounter occurs).
This paper is concerned with the source k-anonymity location privacy when contacting an LBS in OppMNet through obfuscation [4] . We focus on a class of LBSs that does not require user identity to provide the service. Other anonymity and security aspects in OppMNet are outside the scope of this paper. We utilize a stochastic model for location predication and propose a lightweight Markov model to drive the privacypreserving protocol. We recognize two possibilities based on whether the nodes are capable of knowing their exact location (such as GPS coordinates). For the first case where the nodes are able to detect their exact location coordinates, inspired by [5] , we propose a path prediction maintained locally at the individual nodes using Markov model proximity. As for the second case where the nodes are unable to determine their exact location coordinates, we use the recorded IDs for the sighting of fixed infrastructure points (either access points or Global System for Mobile Communications cell IDs) as the location identifier. Unlike [5] , our proposed model utilizes multihop prediction. Nodes exchange their local predictions and that of their own friends when they meet each other, during opportunistic encounters, to help obtain more accurate/updated prediction estimate through shared knowledge exchanged in a distributed way.
Due to OppMNet challenges, users need to utilize each encounter and leverage the social relationships efficiently with other nodes. Intelligent location predication is needed to better enable queries to reach their final destination (LBS) during the obfuscation phase and, hence, increase efficiency (i.e., by increasing overall network success ratio and decreasing number of retransmissions and query delays). In this paper, we present a forwarding protocol that aims to balance between the following: 1) increasing users' location privacy (k-anonymity); 2) maintaining high quality of service (success ratio and delay); and 3) using limited resources (retransmission overhead). We assume that users trust their friends in their social group with providing location obfuscation when an encounter happens. During obfuscation, a node that carries a number of queries to obfuscate searches for the best neighbors to forward these queries to increase the source privacy by keeping the query within the social group.
The three major contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows.
1) We present LPAF, i.e., a k-anonymity-based protocol, offering protection to the users' location information and better privacy while forwarding queries/replies to/from untrusted LBS in OppMNet. obfuscation protocol to achieve higher privacy through mobile node limited/temporal neighborhood knowledge. 3) We present a formal mathematical model to analytically evaluate and simulate the proposed location-privacy protocol in OppMNet. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents protocol design and underlying metrics. Section III presents analytical analysis, including the model and its evaluation. In Section IV, we show performance evaluation comparing the proposed protocol to other benchmark and contemporary location-privacy protocols in pseudorealistic simulation and using real-world data traces. Section V presents related work, whereas Section VI concludes this paper.
II. ACHIEVING k-ANONYMITY WITH LOCATION PRIVACY-AWARE FORWARDING IN OPPORTUNISTIC MOBILE NETWORKS
Many LBSs are being delivered over OppMNet for three reasons.
1) As infrastructure coverage is not always available in urban congested areas and in most rural developing areas, LBS discovery and delivery over opportunistic networks has gained considerable focus [6] . 2) Users interested in location-specific information (e.g., query social events [7] or location-based news [8] ) would normally be within a specific geographical location area for the LBS reply to reach them, and in other cases, the reply delay does not affect the validity for query result. 3) Using OppMNet provides a free-of-charge way to access services and promote digital inclusion [9] of society members to bring equality between poor/deprived people and those from richer backgrounds. Some LBS queries can have high sensitivity to delays, such as real-time navigation for a fast-moving vehicle. However, this is not the scope of this paper. In this paper, we focus on other types of queries that are less delay sensitive (e.g., a tourist who sends a query from a historical castle "which kings lived here?"). For LBSs, delay sensitivity will largely depend on the type of the query asked, the geographical scale for which the query is relevant (e.g., city wide, natural reserves, or tourists attractions), and the urgency of that request.
Here, we present LPAF algorithm and introduce the different collaborative measures that are collected, calculated, and shared locally between nodes to provide obfuscation service to their social group.
A. LPAF Algorithm
A user, who wishes to send a query to an LBS, searches for nearby friends P high and forwards a copy of her query to one of the available friends. This friend then forwards the query intrasocial group using social forwarding for a defined number of hops k all within the user's social group. After the first k hops, the query can be forwarded using any delaytolerant network (DTN) forwarding protocol [Spray and Wait (SnW) in this case]. This allows the source not to reveal her location by directly contacting the LBS but rely on the social forwarding protocol to form an obfuscation path to the LBS.
If any intermediary node was unable to find a set of socially matching neighbors, then it attempts to use other more socially distant neighbors if they meet a lower privacy threshold P low , and they are more likely to deliver the query to its final destination as predicted by their reported "multihop Markov proximity" (MMP ).
We propose two Privacy Qualities: "High Privacy" and "Best effort Privacy." The protocol adaptively tries to achieve one of these depending on the network topology (i.e., how often users meet their friends) and whether intermediaries have enough socially related neighbors to perform location obfuscation. "High Privacy" (P high = 1) refers to the source's k-anonymity when her query has been forwarded over at least k obfuscation hops, and all intermediate users belong to the source's social group. "Best effort Privacy" (P low < 1), on the other hand, refers to the source's k-anonymity when any of the intermediate nodes does not belong to the source's social group (e.g., obfuscation carried by friends of friends). An intermediate node aims to maintain the source's "High Privacy" quality while forwarding a query. It searches through the current neighbors for friends of the source of that query and forwards the obfuscated query to one of them. If none of the current neighbors is a friend of the source, it tries to offer "Best effort Privacy" quality by forwarding the query to one of its own friends to obfuscate, and so on. In which case, the intermediate node matches the neighbors against a lower privacy threshold and uses nodes that pass this test. The detailed algorithm to be followed by the source or intermediary nodes participating in obfuscation is shown in Algorithm 1 and can be explained as follows. Line 1-Line 11 is where user privacy requirements are specified and initial preparation is carried. Line 3 goes over all incoming messages to extract queries that require obfuscation. Each query is checked for any remaining obfuscation hops. If more obfuscation hops are needed, then they are added to M obf . Else, the message has been fully obfuscated and the source real id and the full path information are removed in preparation for forwarding outside the social group. If no queries require obfuscation, the algorithm exits.
Line 12-Line 24 is where nodes filter their neighbors and decide on the best one to perform obfuscation. Each node searches for all existing neighbors and matches them with available queries to obfuscate M obf . If a neighbor has already obfuscated a query before, then it is not further considered for this query. If the current neighbor social distance meets P high (i.e., "High Privacy"), then the query is scheduled for forwarding. If not, the social distance is checked against P low , and the query is scheduled for forwarding if passed (i.e., "Best effort Privacy").
Line 25-Line 30 is the part of the code where obfuscation is carried out. The outgoing messages are sorted by priority and privacy measures. For each outgoing message, the message obfuscation path is updated, and the query is sent to that next hop. To forward the reply back to the requester, we propose that each node in the social group, which has been on the obfuscation path, maintains a mapping table that maintains information about the obfuscated query and its source, which is used to speed up LBS reply addressing. Each of these entries is associated with a timeout value to keep the table size manageable and minimize lookup overhead.
Line 31-Line 41 are for maintenance. All expired obfuscation messages are reported to the LBS application App r and dropped. All remaining outgoing queries are sent using DTN forwarding protocol. Intermediary nodes follow the same process in algorithm 1 k − 1 times.
Because the LBS only knows the pseudo id of the incoming query, it replies to pseudo id . Only the nodes on the request obfuscation path know the real id of the requester. Forwarding of reply will use the mapping between pseudo id and real id to forward the reply back to the requester. Due to the asynchronous operation of forwarding in OppMNet, it is possible that the LBS reply never reaches any of the nodes k − 1 on the original obfuscation path. In this case, we use a similar scheme as in [10] and [11] , utilizing group labels in an attempt to reach the source of the query. The outbound node of the set of intermediate nodes, i.e., last node number k on the obfuscation path, removes the identity of the query source N r and replaces it with a social group label before forwarding the query freely to any neighboring nodes.
B. Distributed and Collaborative Measurements
Using k-anonymity attempts reducing the quality of the location information either in space (spatial) or in time (temporal), hence preventing meaningful use by various LBSs, particularly with low user density scenarios [5] . Our idea of utilizing the social graph as an overlay is to provide the basis for a trust model between OppMNet users, where friends in a social network trust each other to obfuscate their location. Users build a collaborative obfuscation path over asynchronous social-based k hop intermediate nodes. Hence, a temporal location-privacy obfuscation path is formed between the source and the LBS where intermediaries are the users' own social acquaintances. As shown in algorithm 1, nodes require social awareness to select the next hop (see Section II-B1) and location awareness (see Section II-B2) to forward queries toward the destination LBS while building the obfuscation path.
1) Social Awareness: We utilize social links (i.e., friendship relations) to maintain the users' location privacy. Here, we consider the general case where social relations [12] are defined in terms of users' social profile similarity [13] . The source of the query, or an intermediary node obfuscating it, calculates the social distance between the profiles of itself as i and the possible next hop as j, under criterion P c (sd ij ), which is defined as the weighted number of matching profile attributes between the profiles of the two nodes (p i and p j ), and it is calculated as
where function M () searches for the matching degree between the two given social profiles using criterion P c (as defined in Table I ). C() returns the number of attributes in the given profile. p n represents the social profile of a node n. Matching degree reflects both the number of matched profile attributes and the weight each of these attributes in the social profile. 
2) Location Awareness-Markov Proximity:
We represent the location visits using first-order Markov chains as a directed weighted graph between map regions. Each map is denoted as a region R + that is split into smaller regions with a total of n × m squares. Each time a node moves from one region a to another region b, the weight of the edge connecting the two vertices (a, b ∈ R + ) on the graph is denoted by E ab . The weight of each directed edge reflects the probability that the node is going to move from the source vertex representing location l x (∀l x , x ∈ a) to the destination vertex representing location l y (∀l y , y ∈ b). Probability generation function is using a first-order Markov model, in which the probability P (b|a) that the node will move to region b given that it is currently at region a is
Then, a node j is able to calculate its "Markov proximity" (MP ) as the probability of moving from the current location l c to the next location l n as the value P j (n|c).
Assume that two socially related nodes i and j meet at location l j and i has a message that it wishes to obfuscated to reach node d (the untrusted LBS). Then, node i will send a query to j asking for the estimate MP jd . Note that at the time of encounter, the two nodes are within a Bluetooth communication area of about 10 m in radius; hence, we assume that the current location is the same. MP jd query can be piggy packed on the normal transmitted data messages or inside the hello message as its size is negligible compared to the payload size. MP jd is calculated using (3) and is locally tracked by each node and only shared with each node social group. Nodes only respond and calculate MP jd for their current location to prevent external exposure of location information
where v jd represents the directed edge connecting the two vertices corresponding to locations l j and l d , and the direction of movement is from l j to l d .
3) Distributed Multihop Location Obfuscation Prediction:
We now consider the multilevel prediction problem, where two meeting nodes wish to calculate the prediction, not only considering the probability of the other node visiting the LBSs location directly but also using the combined probability of all their respective contacts. For example, node A meets two nodes B and C, where A is interested in location obfuscation service toward LBS. A asks both nodes B and C to provide their probability to visit the LBS considering all their contacts. If node B rarely visits LBS location directly but its contacts do with higher probability than that of node C, then node A will chose node B as the next hop and not C. More formally, let the set of nodes that B encounters over time be called N b ; then, we define MMP as
where α and β are weighting factors. The values of both will be adaptively determined depending on the stage of the obfuscation phase. Let k be the privacy requirements indicating the obfuscation path length and h r be the remaining number of obfuscation hops to achieve this privacy requirement. This allows intermediate nodes to use multihop prediction using localized view of their next hops about their various contacts, instead of relying on greedy and naive single-node prediction. During the obfuscation phase, α and β are defined as follows:
In (5), it is shown that the values of both α and β are dependent on k and h r . The value of α is increasing with increasing k, and it decreases with fewer remaining obfuscation hops (i.e., h r ). The value of β is the complement of α to one, which allows nodes to give more weight to the first term in (4) as queries are about to achieve their anonymity requirement of k hops. Meanwhile, at the start of the obfuscation process, the protocol gives more weight to using intermediate nodes to reach the LBS, which subsequently offers better privacy. When a query has passed k obfuscation hops (i.e., h r = 0), intermediate nodes give all the weight to their next hops' direct MP prediction (or α = 1 and β = 0) in (4).
C. Security Discussion
We assume a trusted-community security model and consider only an external attacker capable of eavesdropping on limited traffic in the network. By trusted community, we refer to the mutual trust between users who belong to the same social group (as defined in Section I), which includes only known friends that the user entrusts to perform location obfuscation. Traffic analysis attacks can be harmful to k-anonymity protocols, including LPAF. Using traffic analysis, the attacker collects information about who is communicating with whom and when. We only consider an attacker with limited presence, i.e., able to eavesdrop over all the traffic along the obfuscation path, but only a subset of forwarded queries over the obfuscation path. In the case where the attacker is omnipresent (i.e., the attacker can monitor all traffic in the network), privacy attacks can be easily launched to identify a certain query source.
The proposed privacy protocol relies on the user social network; subsequently, the movement pattern of users in this group can greatly affect the user privacy. Considering real-life human movements, similarity between the users' visited locations is being observed [12] , but it is shared among the whole social group, which subsequently provides a larger anonymity set and plausible deniability [14] .
III. LPAF ANALYTICAL ANALYSIS
A. Analytical Model
Here, we model our protocol using a probabilistic analytical model. A number of models have been proposed to model opportunistic communication in ad hoc networks [15] - [17] . For the purpose of this paper, we focus on driving a model that is not only temporal with respect to timing of event but also spatial (incorporating location knowledge). We use a spatial Poisson process [18] , which is also known as spatial point process, with an associated rate of events λ. The spatial Poisson process is useful for modeling ad hoc wireless networks [19] in general and particularly location-dependent protocol. Using the spatial dimension, we can calculate the probability of a node being in a certain location once the system has reached a steady state and the probability of nodes being neighbors. Let N be the set of nodes moving within a region on the map denoted as ]] ≤ r. Let P (#(R(v))) be the probability that i nodes exist within the communication area R(v) ⊂ R + . P (#(R(v)) = i) is formally defined as follows:
Subsequently, we define the probability that a node v has at most i nodes within the communication area R(v) ⊂ R + as follows:
Let P 1 (#(R(v))) be the probability that a node v has at least one neighbor, i.e., the two nodes are able to communicate with each other. According to Poisson's theory, the interarrival distance between events is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variable, and the process is memoryless. This leads to the number of arrival events at any location in R + occurring after time t to be independent from the number of events occurring before time t
From the probability theory, i≥0 P (#(R(v)) = i) = 1, which can be rewritten as P (#(R(v)) ≥ 1) + P (#(R(v)) = 0) = 1. We can write (8) as follows:
For the purpose of developing the LPAF model, we need to focus on the obfuscation path rather than the immediate neighboring nodes. We are interested in modeling the multihop communication path used for obfuscation. Let P (|E(v) ≥ i) be the probability of node v forming i multihop path of successive encounters (i.e., using any available nodes) using epidemic protocol. This is equal to the probability that each node from the set of the i intermediate nodes has at least one successful encounter at its first hop (because the interarrival of events in the Poisson process is i.i.d.). P (|E(v) ≥ i) can be formally defined as follows:
When the node's communication area is very small compared with the dimensions of the network, i.e., R L, [16] shows that we can obtain an approximate rate of encounters (or intermeeting time) for any node in the network p. This rate of encounter can be obtained using the following formula:
where c is a mobility model-related constant. For the purpose of our analytical evaluation, we consider only the random direction model with c = 1 and epidemic packet forwarding. For more complex real-life validation, we evaluate LPAF through intensive simulation in different scenarios. In addition, v rel is the relative speed between nodes and can be calculated assuming an average stable node speed in the network v a . According to [15] , we can obtain the number of nodes I(t) that has received a packet after time t assuming a single initial source as follows:
where p is the rate of encounters, as calculated in (11) . Therefore, we can then calculate the ratio of nodes that has received a packet after time t as ϕ e (t) for the epidemic protocol
In the case of the proposed protocol LPAF, the probability that a node communicates during the obfuscation phase is limited to only within its social community due to privacy constraints. We develop a new probabilistic model to reflect this behavior. Consider two nodes a and b, where node a wants to obfuscate a query by sending it through node b. Let event A be that node a has at least one neighbor b (i.e., at least a and b are within the communication area of each other), and let B be the event that one of these neighbors is from the social group of a (i.e., b is a social friend of a). More formally, let A:
] ≤ r and B: b ∈ S a . Let P (A|B) be the conditional probability that event A will occur given the knowledge that event B occurred. Note that since we are using a random direction model, the probability of encounter between socially connected nodes is not affected, i.e., it is shown in the literature that human encounters are not random and that friends meet each other more often than they would meet someone who is a complete stranger [20] , [21] . Taking this into consideration, we emphasize that the analytical study presents the worst case view of LPAF performance due to the lack of this connection between the social layer and nodes' mobility. This can be expressed as follows:
Let P f (i) denote the probability that a node v meets i successive disjoint friend nodes (i.e., different nodes belonging to node v social group S v ). Probability P f (i) can be expressed as
Now, we would like to calculate the probability that a node v will successfully communicate under a privacy requirement of one hop obfuscation. We use the set of intermediate disjoint nodes from the multihop path E(v) from node v to the destination and not the set of nodes within the transmission range of v because we are calculating the probability of forming a multihop path, rather than the nodes' immediate neighborhood (i.e., one hop). To this end, we define two events A and B as follows:
A: {meeting at least one node}; B: {the node is a friend}. Using probability theory and (14), we can find the probability P s (|(E(v))| = 1) that a node v will successfully communicate under a privacy requirement of one hop obfuscation can be expressed as follows:
The first operand in (16) is the probability that a node v will encounter at least one node. The second operand can be calculated using (15), as P f when i = 1
Using definitions from (9) and (15)
From the definition of LPAF, a node v needs to form an i hop obfuscation path using i disjoint nodes for the communication with an LBS to be successful (i.e., in LPAF case, the nodes are more constrained by the privacy requirements and will not be able to forward packets as freely as when using epidemic). Let events A, B denote the following:
A: {meeting at least one node for i successive hops}; B: {i nodes belong to the source's social group}. Furthermore, let P s (|E(v)| ≥ i) be the probability that a node v will successfully communicate over i hop obfuscation path. P s (|E(v)| ≥ i) is formally defined as follows:
Let us focus only on event A; the probability of forming a multihop path using i nodes can be obtained using (10) . The second operand that represents the probability that event B occurs can be obtained using (15)
From the definition of LPAF, it is important to note that we are interested in the events where i nodes will encounter each other following the DTN store-carry-forward paradigm. Hence, event A relates to the nodes' ability to form an i multihop path to reach the destination. This event is quite different from the event of having a neighborhood that has i neighbors. Substituting into (19) , the probability that a node v will successfully communicate over i hop obfuscation path can be expressed as follows:
Let γ be the ratio between the probability that a node v can successfully communicate using LPAF over i hop obfuscation path and the probability that a node can form i hop path using any nodes, i.e., without obfuscation restrictions using epidemic routing. We define γ as follows:
Using (9) and (20), γ can be simplified as follows:
For the proposed protocol LPAF, we can then calculate the number of nodes that received a query after time t assuming a single initial source I s (t). We substitute γ into (12) taking into consideration the value calculated in (22)
Let ϕ s be the ratio of nodes that has received a query after time t using LPAF. ϕ s is defined as follows:
B. Analytical Model Evaluation
Here, we propose an analytical model that enables the study of LPAF, in terms of logical and quantitative relationships, to see how the model reacts to different parameters such as privacy levels k and social group sizes |S| and what impact each has on the quality of service such as delivery ratio and delay.
Hence, we perform extensive simulations using the proposed analytical model for LPAF to study the feasibility/limits of conceiving obfuscation path for different privacy levels k and social group sizes |S|. We show that with using the proposed LPAF, an obfuscation path can be still constructed even at high privacy levels k at the expense of lower quality of service represented by lower delivery ratio and higher delays. It is worth mentioning that although we show that the protocol can work in OppMNet at extreme situations (characterized by low social groups sizes |S| ≤ 30% and high privacy level of k = 8), these situations are not likely to exist in real life and present a worst-case scenario for LPAF. This is because the analytical model does not consider the network topology and how it is dynamically influenced by social ties.
To validate the proposed analytical model for LPAF, we start by comparing its performance to epidemic forwarding, as shown in Fig. 1 . LPAF has a three-hop obfuscation path at social Fig. 1 . Percentage of nodes (y-axis) that receive a packet after time t (x-axis). ϕe(t) for epidemic and ϕs(t) for LPAF using (k = 3 and |S| = 50).
Fig. 2. Probability (y-axis) to form various obfuscation path lengths i (x-axis) under different numbers of social group size. Ps(|E(v)| ≥ i) is for LPAF, and
group size of 50% of the total nodes in the network. We choose a moderate social group size using information obtained from experiments shown in Fig. 2 . The number of obfuscation hops (k = 3) was chosen at the number of hops where the protocol achieves about 25% probability to reaching all nodes or at 50% of the protocol maximum achievable probability P s . The results shown assume a single initial source sending one query. We can see that epidemic protocol is capable of disseminating the packet quicker and that LPAF manages to follow with a slight delay due to the higher location anonymity provided.
To understand the impact that the social group size |S| has on the probability of forming obfuscation path, we conduct the experiments shown in Fig. 2 . The figure shows the probability of forming obfuscation path of different lengths i for an increasing trend of the social group size |S|, and we compare them to the probability using epidemic (which forms the same number of hops i using any node even several times). The size of social group ranged from 50 to 200 nodes or 25% to 100%. We can see a decreasing probability of forming a successful delivery with longer obfuscation path (as i increases), which is due to the extra restriction on finding socially related nodes (i.e., of course, not yet used). Finding such friend nodes is affected primarily by the social group size |S|, among other factors such as nodes' average speed and communication area R, and the total area of R + . We can see that increasing |S| allows for an increased probability of reaching higher privacy. As |S| approaches |N |, i.e., theoretically, the whole network is one social group, the probability falls as i increases, and this is because intermediate nodes are selected only once. This validates the privacy restrictions developed through the analytical model for obfuscationbased communication using LPAF. Interestingly, this shows that the probability of forming obfuscation path logarithmically drops with respect to the number of obfuscation hops i.
We can see the probability to form the same i multihop path using epidemic protocol in Fig. 2 , as derived using (10) . It is considerably much higher compared with LPAF, and it is approaching 0.99 for i < 15 hops. This is because epidemic protocol can form any multihop path and reuse nodes previously been on that path, i.e., nodes that have participated in query forwarding before. Meanwhile, for LPAF, a node cannot reforward a query to a node that has obfuscated it before because this does not increase the source's privacy (i.e., the anonymity set does not increase).
We evaluate the LPAF performance convergence over time with respect to social group size |S| (see Fig. 3 ) and locationprivacy requirements k (see Fig. 4 ). Fig. 3 shows LPAF performance under different conditions of social group sizes ranging between 10% and 60% of the total number of nodes |N | under moderate location privacy (k = 3). The graph shows that LPAF manages to disseminate the packets to all nodes in the social group. For example, about 40% of the social group nodes receive packets in less than 1600 s, for an average social group size (|S| ≥ 50%). We can see that as the social group size grows, the percentage of nodes receiving the packet sharply increases, i.e., the time required to reach the group gets shorter as more friends participate in forwarding. This is because the probability of meeting socially related nodes becomes higher, which allows the packet to be forwarded faster and to more nodes than in scenarios with small social group size.
To choose the best suitable protocol configuration parameters in a given environment, we need to combine the main param- Fig. 4 . Percentage of nodes (y-axis) that receive a packet for various social group sizes (x-axis). ϕe(t) is for epidemic, and ϕs(t) is for LPAF. k ranges between two and eight hops.
eters to show their impact on the protocol performance (e.g., percentage of nodes receiving a packet ϕ s (t)). Taking both time and |S| as the protocol two degrees of freedoms is shown in Fig. 3 , whereas |S| and k are shown in Fig. 4 . Fig. 4 shows LPAF theoretical performance under various location-privacy requirements. Function ϕ s (t) is sampled at t = t s to compare performance, where (t s = 200[s]) is chosen because it is the time when the protocols are in transition with respect to |S|, as shown in Fig. 3 . We can see that ϕ s (t) generally increases as |S| increases, and this validates the same impact shown in Fig. 3 . The figure also shows that as k increases, the slope of the curve becomes steeper (i.e., the social group size has less impact on the protocol performance as k increases). Moreover, for the same value of |S|, we see that as k increases, the performance drops (i.e., the curve gets lower). For example, at k = 2 and k = 4, we see that when the social group size is about 85% of the total number of nodes in the network (|S| = 85%), the percentage of reached social nodes is in the range of 30% and 10% at t = t s , respectively. Fig. 5 shows a 3-D performance comparison of two different location privacy levels from low to high (k = 2 and 8). The figure clearly shows the impact of the privacy level and social group size on the delay and percentage of nodes receiving the query. On the x-axis, we show social group size |S|, the time t on the y-axis, and the result achieved ϕ s (t). We can see that the achieved level of packet penetration to other nodes at some social group size can be easily obtained.
Using Fig. 5 , we can draw a plane perpendicular to the x-axis at a point equal to a given social group size |S| in the network, and we obtain a 2-D plane showing the various expected performances over time. In the figure, we observe a general increase in the percentage of reached nodes as we move to a bigger group size, which is consistent with both Figs. 2 and 3. We can see faster convergence (less time) to reach more nodes as k decreases (less privacy). This figure can be used to guide the user selection of the level of location privacy k under specific network conditions by determining the expected ϕ s (t) as the average required user data utility and user tolerated level of delay. For example, for a network with a known social group size |S| equal to 50% and a user data utility requirement to reach 40% of the nodes within 500 s, the user will be able to achieve this combination under privacy level k = 2 but not at a higher privacy level of k = 8. On the other hand, if the number of social group size can be controlled, then the previous graph can be used to show the required percentage of social nodes to achieve a certain privacy level. For example, if a user wishes to maintain privacy level of k = 2 and a data utility requirement to reach 50% of the nodes within 1000 s, then the required percentage of social group nodes must be more than 60%. Fig. 6 shows LPAF achievable privacy level at various social group sizes in the network for three different probabilities to successfully encounter k friends P f . P f , as defined in (15), directly affects the probability that a user will have successful communication with the LBS. The figure shows the tradeoff between privacy levels k for different social group sizes |S| in the networks, i.e., the user has higher probability of successful obfuscation for higher k as |S| increases. For example, a user who belongs to a social group of size 120 has 50% probability of successful communication for k range below two hops while only 10% probability in case of higher k (from four to five obfuscation hops).
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We compare LPAF performance against No_Privacy, Oraclebased k-anonymity [22] (OBK), social-only [22] (SLPD), and AntiLocalization Anonymous Routing (ALAR) [23] protocols. We implement all privacy-preserving protocols as extensions to the Opportunistic Network Environment (ONE) simulator [24] . We track the performance across three dimensions: 1) quality of service expressed as success ratio SR and end-to-end delay; 2) quality of anonymization reflected in the achieved number of obfuscation hops k; and 3) energy efficiency tracked through the retransmission overhead.
In addition to using an urban scenario, we perform evaluation using real-world data trace of Bluetooth and Wi-Fi collected at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC). For ALAR, we set the number of the alternative disjoint path (k = 2) and the number of splits (S = 2), which is similar to the settings used in [23] . The remaining simulation parameters are as in [4] . Using these evaluation results, we confirm the analytical model results in Section III-B for an increasing privacy level k. Although we study performance for different social group sizes |S|, we include only the results for the challenging low social scenario and omit other results due to lack of space.
A. Pseudosimulation in Urban Scenario in Helsinki City Center
For the purpose of initial evaluation, we experimented with a well-known benchmark urban scenario for Helsinki city center. We combine the ONE simulator [24] probabilistic map-based movement models with a Helsinki map to generate a semirealistic urban scenario in Helsinki city center. The objective of this set of experiments is to study the proposed privacy-preserving protocol in pseudorealistic city-center scenario and measure its effectiveness.
Without loss of generality, we develop LPAF over a quotabased DTN forwarding protocol, i.e., SnW [25] . We evaluate the social-based protocols (i.e., SLPD and LPAF) across varying social matching thresholds, i.e., users can select different values for P low /P high (as defined in Table I ). Users who desire more privacy set both P high and P low to a value closer to 1 and vice versa. P low is configurable and was set to 0.5 (50IGNORE) for all experiments. Location queries are sent every 20 s from a number of nodes belonging to a pool of 40 tourists scattered walking and querying locations around the city. Each member of this group has a defined social profile, and it is used to measure the social distance to other nodes (as explained in Section II-B1). We assume that all scenarios have one moving LBS, with nodes reporting and sharing latest location of the LBS.
1) Network Model:
We consider a network that has a set of N nodes that are actively relaying messages in the OppMNets when requested. Consideration of selfish or other malicious behaviors that would cause nodes to not participate in the forwarding process are out of the scope of this paper. This paper is not concerned with vehicular technology and focuses only on social opportunistic network. We utilize a set of heterogeneous mobile nodes (pedestrians, cars, and trams) positioned on top of the Helsinki city map, where cars and trams are used to ferry data between pedestrians when the possibility occurs. Communication between pedestrians is performed over OppMNet using Bluetooth, whereas communication between trams and cars is over Wi-Fi. The different nodes exhibit different characteristics. People-carried mobile devices have smaller buffers compared with other mobile nodes. The citycenter scenario consists of 80 pedestrians, 40 cars, six trams, and 10 access points. Pedestrians communicate between them through Bluetooth and receive information from cars, trams, and access points if within communication range using Wi-Fi.
We assume, as in a typical city scenario, that these trams have contact with access points when in communication range or otherwise be disconnected. Trams are expected to execute LPAF protocol and that users trust the trams' operator to handle their queries and perform obfuscation operations. If a node encounters a tram, it includes a profile-matching criterion and the required privacy level for the query to obfuscate and forwards this information over to the tram. Tram extracts the privacy-related information and searches for other nodes using the profile-matching criterion to obfuscate this query.
2) Simulation Results in the City Center: We evaluate LPAF under varying privacy-level requirements k, varying number of source nodes accessing the LBS (senders), and different social group sizes |S|. All experiments were conducted at high social matching threshold (P = 1) for both SLPD and LPAF. Each point on the graphs is the average of 50 runs, and in each run, nodes were initially positioned randomly over the map. The senders are selected from a pool of highly social nodes (central nodes or hubs), starting with one sender or 3% of the pool size, then five (or 13% of the pool size), 10, 15, etc., until we get to 40 senders (or 100%). Increasing the number of senders increases the offered load to the network, hence showing protocols' stability. Experiments examining the effect of the social group size were conducted using only one single sender selected at random at each run. Fig. 7(a) shows the normalized success ratio for LPAF compared with No_Privacy and the other privacy protocols. For both SLPD at k > 3 and LPAF at k > 6, results are 0%; thus, they are not shown on any of the graphs. The graph shows that LPAF is able to deliver queries in a privacy-preserving way for k = 3 higher than the other location-privacy protocols (namely, SLPD and ALAR). The figure shows that ALAR has a steady but low success ratio, and it is considerably lower than other protocols (≈ 5%). LPAF has a rising success ratio as the number of senders increases, whereas SLPD is constantly below by an average of 11%. LPAF is able to achieve a maximum of ≈50%, which is higher than both SLPD and ALAR, because nodes collaborate and share predictions to achieve the privacy level and move toward the LBS. LPAF is approaching the theoretical maximum success ratio maintained by OBK that uses an Oracle. Fig. 7(b) shows the average delay in seconds for each of the protocols. No_Privacy and OBK opportunistic forwarding have the lowest delay as they deliver queries with no obfuscation or using an Oracle. We include both protocols as benchmark for comparison, where OBK is not suitable for real-world OppMNets scenario because it uses a centralized server and assumes future knowledge of network events.
In both Fig. 7 (a) and (b), it is shown that ALAR has low success ratio and high delay; this is because nodes wait for k distinctive neighbors for each of the S splits belonging to the same query. This means that each query requires (S × k) distinctive neighbors for all splits to be forwarded out of a source, or a total of four unique neighbors in our case, but in two sets, we have one for each split (S = 2). Moreover, ALAR excludes neighbors from being the possible next hop for a particular query rapidly, as soon as neighbors have received one split, and this causes additional fragmentation to an already fragmented network topology in OppMNets. Fig. 7(c) shows the normalized average retransmission overhead, i.e., relative to the maximum number of relayed queries. We observe that LPAF retransmission overhead is linearly increasing with the number of senders and below No_Privacy forwarding. LPAF overhead is generally greater than OBK. For ALAR, it reaches a steady overhead level when senders are greater than 25% to reach around 22%, which is due to the low success ratio (≈ 7%). No_Privacy has higher overhead because it utilizes a greedier approach to maximize delivery [25] . This is because location-privacy requirements act as a leash that controls and selectively forwards queries hence less retransmissions overhead. LPAF is efficient because other protocols send many replicas of a query (or its splits) that never reach the destination and get dropped, but LPAF aims to use each replica with prediction to better direct them toward the destination LBS. Fig. 8 shows MMP , which is a weighted measure of MMP with respect to the number of queries successfully reaching each hop. Using MMP has the effect of normalizing the MMP measurement across the different values of k while maintaining per-hop distinctive results. The figure shows that messages have better MMP as they are forwarded over each successive hop toward the LBS. The figure shows that the weighted MMP drops as k increases. This is because less queries successfully pass through the whole obfuscation path, which leads to a drop in the weighted Markov proximity obtained through multiple-hop prediction; thus, LPAF (k = 4) has lower weighted proximity compared with LPAF (k = 3).
As expected from the analytical model evaluation (see Section III-B), we notice in Fig. 9(a) that LPAF success ratio increases as we increase the social group size |S|, which validates Figs. 2 and 3 in the evaluation of the analytical model, and decreases with increased value of k validating results in Fig. 4 . |S| is increased by selecting more nodes from the pool of 40 nodes (around 30% of the total network nodes). We can see that as the social group size increases, the success ratio increases because LPAF is able to find more socially related nodes. This is shown as a higher probability of forming k obfuscation path shown in the analytical model in Fig. 2 . LPAF's ability to utilize these extra social-related nodes enhances the overall success ratio as more encounters are being utilized for obfuscation and to achieve the targeted k. Fig. 9(b) shows the associated overall average message delay; we notice that as k increases, we experience greater delay as message gets buffered longer awaiting suitable encounters. On the other hand, we can see that as social group size increases, the delay drops to minutes. This drop in delay with higher |S| is consistent with the time delay presented in the x-axis in Fig. 5 with different values of |S| in the analytical model evaluation. As shown, ϕ s (t) rising faster in time (less delay) |S| increases.
B. Real-World Data Trace Simulation Using UIUC Data Set 1) Network Model:
The UIUC [26] data set is a real-world data trace collected at the UIUC. It contains the media access control (MAC) addresses of 28 Bluetooth devices and multiple Wi-Fi access points collected over a three-week period during March 2010. Despite the lack of nodes' exact location information (e.g., GPS) at the time of recording events, this data set is particularly useful in evaluating location privacy as it contains the MAC addresses of stationary Wi-Fi access points encountered by the mobile devices.
To build the social relationship between users, we perform analysis on the regularity of users existing at the same location similar to [12] and [27] . We statistically study the frequency of devices encountering each other and encountering similar Wi-Fi access points, which indicates that users carrying these devices exist at the same location regularly. We then generate a user-to-user (pairwise) total encounter frequency. As participants in this data set are faculty, staff, and students, more socially connected nodes meet inside and outside the university campus. We experimented with two distinct social network scenarios (i.e., low and moderate social networks |S|) to compare performance obtained with that from the analytical model in Figs. 3 and 5 . In low |S|, two users are considered friends if their encounter frequency falls within the upper quartile (the top 25%) of the distribution of all node pairs' encounter frequency. The resulting social network has an average |S| equal to 5 and a standard deviation of 4 (i.e., |S| ≈ 18%). In moderate |S|, two users are socially connected if their encounter frequency is greater than the average encounter frequency of all users' pairs. The resulting social network has an average |S| equal to 10 friends and a standard deviation of 5 (i.e., |S| ≈ 50%). We observed generally better results for the moderate social scenarios compared with low social scenarios, but we omit details due to space limitations.
The data set duration is split into three equal simulation duration periods of one week each (seven days). All MAC addresses for external devices were discarded, i.e., only the 28 participants were sending/receiving/relaying message during the simulations. We repeat the simulation three times, and the results were averaged. A socially well-connected node is chosen to be the untrusted LBS, and the remaining 27 nodes act as query sources (senders). LBS queries were sent at random intervals with a constant rate of one query every 6 h.
2) Simulation Results in UIUC:
Here, the success ratio and delay comparing protocols that offer location privacy in the OppMNet are shown. We examine the performance of LPAF under two social scenarios (i.e., low and moderate social networks). This is to validate the impact of the social group size, with results obtained from the analytical model evaluation in Section III-B. Fig. 10 shows a set of experiments comparing locationprivacy protocols' performance using UIUC real-world data trace. The social network between nodes is a low social network scenario (|S| ≈ 18%). Fig. 10(a) shows that LPAF manages to be slightly higher, i.e., better, in mean success ratio than the other two protocols and that LPAF performance drops (lower boxplot) to become very close to SLPD and ALAR. This is due to the restriction imposed by the limited number of friends to obfuscate queries and the drop in probability of forming k obfuscation path shown in the analytical model Fig. 2 . LPAF drop in success ratio validates the analytical model performance shown in Fig. 3 , where we see lower percentage of nodes receiving packets as |S| decreases. Fig. 10(b) shows the delays incurred by the different protocols. First, we can see that LPAF and SLPD have both suffered additional delays higher than ALAR. This is due to the two protocols' reliance on the social network size |S|; hence, more time is spent searching for friends in a low social network. This relation validates the earlier finding in the analytical model in Fig. 3 , which shows a slower rise and higher delay as |S| decreases.
V. RELATED WORK
There has been little attention given to location privacy threats in OppMNets, with insufficient user-centric analysis and solutions. Most existing research studies rely on an online TTP, such as mobile phone operators [28] or online centralized server [29] , which is generally not applicable to OppMNets.
One way to provide higher location privacy is to limit access to location information through access control mechanisms [7], [29] . PShare [29] is a secure location sharing protocol. It distributes location data across multiple location servers to increase robustness against attack and ensure imprecise user position in case a server is compromised. [7] presents a solution where Location Servers (LS) are treated as un-trusted datastores, and LBSs are offered by friends in the network. All location information sent to the LS is encrypted, and only authorized users or applications are granted access. Both schemes assume an online LS, and access control is applied using public-private keys or multisecret sharing.
Another approach to providing higher location privacy is to obfuscate the location information by generating false location update events that cause diluted users movement traces at LBSs' side. CacheCloak [5] is an anonymization system for communication in Vehicular Ad hoc NETworks (VANETs). SPRING [30] , where road-side units (RSUs) are positioned at highly social intersects, is used to temporarily store the forwarded packets and hence prevent an adversary from tracking its source. The two approaches rely on pretrusted and controlled nodes (e.g., anonymizing server or RSUs) to offer obfuscation.
Our proposed protocol is based on k-anonymity [31] , which is a widely used approach to anonymity in many fields such as communication networks and databases. One popular way of offering location k-anonymity is through cloaking. Cloaking is the technique by which the geospatial dimension is divided into areas called cloaks, and the user is k-anonymized if the formed cloaking region is occupied by at least k − 1 other users; hence, the user's location is hidden among k anonymity set. Spatial and temporal cloaking techniques such as [32] use a centralized location broker service that is used to form the cloaking region. Cloaking techniques are not suitable for OppMNets because of limited communication area and diverse nodes' mobility.
On the other hand, mixing offers location privacy by ensuring that user's identity is kept private, and it is based on untraceable email communication proposed by Chaum [33] . A number of mixing techniques have been proposed [34] . During the mixing process, a trusted entity performs shuffling of users' identities inside a specially constructed mix zone so that old and new user identities are not linkable. This process requires that nodes physically move into and stay inside the mix zone throughout the mixing process to prevent eavesdropping by an attacker. Mixing is not suitable for OppMNets as it requires that a specified number of nodes coexist inside the mix zone for the whole duration this operation.
Reference [35] proposes anonymization for users of LBSs in mobile environments using a TTP entity, which hides the location and profile attributes of the query from untrusted service. Source Unobservability by Network Coding (SUNC) [36] is a privacy-preserving scheme that maintains the source unobservability in multihop wireless networks. SUNC utilizes network coding and specifically designed dummy messages to ensure packet unlinkability and source anonymity. SUNC assumes a multihop wireless network and does not consider the long delays, mobility, and disruption impact typically expected in DTNs. SpotME [37] is a technique to preserve users' location privacy through reporting of fake locations. The approach uses randomized response algorithm and is addressing specific targeted applications.
SLPD [22] is a location-privacy protocol that obfuscates queries using the social relationship between nodes. SLPD is not adaptive to the topology or individual nodes' connectivity patterns. The authors compare their work with OBK: a benchmark k-anonymity location-privacy protocol which requires an Oracle with complete future knowledge of the network. OBK relies on centralized and trusted matchmaker server and is not practically applicable to OppMNets scenario. ALAR [23] enables a source to send messages without revealing its physical location while opportunistically communicating over DTNs. The source splits each message into multiple S segments (each is called split), and each split is transmitted through an alternative disjoint path k. ALAR nodes only forward a split when they have k neighbors that have not been observed for any of the previously sent splits of the same message.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed new privacy-preserving protocol LPAF that offers adaptive, fully distributed, and socially driven location-privacy forwarding. LPAF employs a distributed lightweight Markov-based location prediction model to guide the obfuscation phase of message propagation to the LBSs. LPAF utilizes social links between nodes to form an obfuscation path between the source and the LBS to offer best effort kanonymity location privacy. We evaluate the proposed protocol using analytical model simulation and extensive experiments in both city-center map-based heterogeneous mobility scenarios and using real-world data trace. Results show that by adapting the privacy within tolerance to nodes' own connectivity and incorporating location prediction, LPAF performs better than existing location-privacy protocols in terms of success ratio with small overhead. LPAF is able to maintain around 10% success ratio at high user privacy-level requirement when other protocols fail by adaptively lowering the achievable location privacy to the network conditions.
As future work, we plan to extend the protocol to handle situations in which the exact location of the nodes is not known and examine additional movement models and rural scenarios.
